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DINING ROOM EVENTS
CHECKLIST

Time/Date of Event: 1200 - Friday, 29 April 1988

Event: Breakfast _____ Luncheon XX Dinner _____ Other _____

Host: DCI XX DDCI _____ ExDir _____ Other _____

Place: DCI D.R XX Executive Dining Room _____ Other _____

In Honor Of: Dr. Brzezinski

Total Number of Attendees: *4

Sponsoring Component: O/DCI Charge To: 45005

Contact: Peggy Ext.: [redacted] Room: 7D60 Hqs 25X1

Date Reservation Made: 20 April 88 By: SS

EDR and Joyce advised: 21 April 88 Copies To: DCI; DDCI; DDO; EDR;

Place Cards:
Ordered: _____ Received: _____ To EDR: _____
Date Date Date

Menu: Grilled Duck on Assorted Salad Greens
Norwegian Salmon with Smoked Salmon Center
Vegetables
Iced Tea with Meal
Chocolate Sundae with Toasted Pecan Halves
Coffee/Tea

*Judge William H. Webster, host
Mr. Robert M. Gates, co-host
Dr. Brzezinski, guest of honor
Mr. Richard F. Stolz, Jr.



Cracks in the Soviet empire

Zbigniew Brzezinski finds pre-revolutionary symptoms in an emergent Central Europe

If East Europe is the product of Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam. In other words, it reflects the power realities of the mid-1940s. Those conditions produced a situation in which there were only two Europes: West and East.

That division was in practice defined by the confrontation between the United States, itself a cultural and democratic extension of Western Europe, and the Soviet Union, which is technically, in part, an Eastern European state, though culturally much influenced by its prolonged exposure to oriental, despotic traditions. This condition is now gradually coming to an end. We are witnesses to an important historical development: the revival of the authentic and distinctive personality of a major segment of Europe: Central Europe.

Two centrally important facts have defined the last 40 years of that region's history. The first is that Communism was imposed on it from outside, by the politically and culturally alien Soviet Union, where Marxism had been adapted to its own special conditions; it was thence grafted by force on to societies with altogether different political notions, religious and cultural traditions, and subjective sense of identity.

The second is that the dominant nation was viewed by the subordinated nations as culturally inferior. This draws a sharp contrast between the experience of the Soviet empire and the French or British empires, where notwithstanding the objective element of subjugation, there was some sense that the dominant nation possessed values with which the subordinate wished to identify. There is, of course, a certain irony in the notion that a Polish peasant should view as culturally inferior the people who produced Tolstoy or Dostoevsky, but that is irrelevant. The fact is that the average inhabitant of the region felt that domination by Moscow was a retrogressive step.

Both of these very important handicaps to Soviet imperial sway were obscured by the understandable desire of the population of the region for rapid social and economic recovery. They were obscured by the mirage of catching up with the West, which was one of the major claims of the new Communist régimes: that relatively quickly Poland or Czechoslovakia would outstrip, say, Great Britain in industrial development and general modernisation. They were obscured by reverence to Soviet power, very real in the wake of the defeat of Nazi Germany, and even by a perverse admiration for Stalin's personal power.

These brief statements define a subjective attitude of East Europeans towards Soviet power in the early phases of the imposition of Communism. All of that is now gone. Recovery has not closed the gap with the West, and everybody in the region knows it. The Soviet Union is seen as stagnating. Its technological lag has had a devastating effect on the notion that the Soviet system represents the way of the future.

The greatest impact of all of these changes has been felt in Poland. Solidarity, though it lost the tactical battle for organisational freedom, in fact won the strategic struggle for societal emancipation. Today in Poland there is genuine political life. It does not exist in the sense that we expect — of an open, institutionalised, constitutionally governed political competition. But at least it involves a dialogue, the exchange of views, and the articulation not just of opposition to Communism but of liberal, social democratic, conservative and even right-wing nationalist programmes as an alternative to the ruling régime. It is clear, and the public opinion

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polls confirm it, that by and large Communism in Poland is discredited.

All of this is taking place in a setting of massive economic stagnation and growing economic crisis. Barring a return to terror, which is unlikely, or a massive social explosion, which is possible, followed by Soviet intervention, which is not to be ruled out, continued decay and a gradual transformation into some kind of pluralist system is possible. All is dominated by a growing desire to be part of an authentic Europe.

This problem for Moscow is accentuated by growing regional unrest, of which Poland may be the most advanced, but is by no means the only, case. Throughout the region, we are witnessing the organic rejection by the social system of an alien transplant. The region as a whole is experiencing today both political liberalisation and economic retrogression — a classic formula, as we know, for revolution.

In Hungary, even the head of the People's Patriotic Front, a Communist mass organisation, has recently spoken in terms of the eventual need for formal opposition parties, and has acknowledged that the current monopolistic rule by the Communist Party may have to be viewed as a transitional phase.

Czechoslovakia, a country which became a political cemetery for the 20 years after 1968, is undergoing a political revival. Dubcek recently granted an interview to an Italian newspaper which read like a political manifesto, raising again the banner of the proud Spring. Demonstrations have once more taken place on the streets of Prague. When Gorbachev visited Prague in April, his principal spokesman, Gennady Gerasimov, was asked, at a press conference attended by Communist and non-Communist journalists, what in his view was the difference between Dubcek and Gorbachev. The amazing answer: "Nineteen years".

In Romania, where the political scene is deprived of an authentic dialogue, it is beginning to be dominated by bitter social resentment against extraordinary poverty and a personality cult of unique vulgarity.

In the past, dissident activities took place in isolation. The unrest in East Germany in 1953 was confined to East Germany. The events in 1956 happened in Poland and Hungary at the same time but without any communion. The Spring of Prague of 1968 was an isolated phenomenon, as was Gdansk in 1970. Now, for the first time, dissident activity is assuming a regional scale.

All of this is taking place in the context of increasingly grave economic conditions. A recent analysis in the *New York Times* stated : "While the newly industrialised countries of the Third World are building factories with the most advanced technology, Eastern Europe is increasingly a museum of the early industrial age. Eastern Europe is rapidly becoming part of the Third World, and many Third World countries are surpassing it economically."

In addition, Eastern Europe is now heavily indebted. Poland's case is notorious. In Hungary, indebtedness has reached a level of $2,000 per head, the highest in the world. All of this raises the question: how soon and in what form will the zone of ecnomic stagnation and political unrest become the zone of revolution? It is not inappropriate to wonder whether the year 1988 might not be initiating the new spring of nations in Europe, a parallel to 1848.

There are now five countries in Eastern Europe which are potentially ripe for a revolutionary explosion. It could happen in more than one at the same time. It cannot be predicted with any certainty — it may not happen at all — but the pre-conditions are certainly there.

This poses a massive dilemma for the Kremlin. Major military intervention to crush any such outbreak would certainly also mean the end of *perestroika* in the Soviet Union. It would end the chances that may exist for any sort of modernisation in the Soviet Union. It could even affect adversely some of the key players in the Kremlin. It is quite striking that in response to these developments, the Kremlin is placing less and less emphasis, publicly and privately, on ideological homogeneity and orthodoxy within the bloc, and more and more on the reciprocal benefits of economic co-operation and continued security links.

It is an attempt to base the relationship on an enhanced common interest, rather than on the hierarchy of subordination and a system of ideological orthodoxy. It is doubtful whether this will suffice to cope with the mounting desire of the region to be again, simply but genuinely, a part of Europe, not submerged as an East Europe with its political and cultural centre in Moscow.

This has far-reaching implications. It means that in a significant way the competition for the future of Europe, which has been under way for some 40 years now, is shifting from the political defence of Western Europe against possible Soviet domination to the problem of the survival of Soviet domination in the east. It is a geopolitical and historical shift of some importance.

During the 1950s and even the 1960s, the Soviet Union and its Communist parties in Western Europe represented a genuine threat to freedom west of the Elba. The Soviet Union enjoyed a kind of historical prestige, as well as some sense that it was riding the way of the future. We did not forget how optimistic Khrushchev had been in 1960, when he not only categorically predicted, but had it explicitly inscribed in the official Communist Party programme, that by 1970 the Soviet Union would be the number one industrial power in the world. This prediction has been excised from the newly revised Communist Party programme.

The Soviet empire is clearly on the defensive. Eastern Europe is stirring and redefining itself as Central Europe. Today the average Czechoslovakian, Hungarian or Pole openly professes that he feels closer to the typical Austrian, even German, and certainly Frenchman, than to his eastern neighbours.

Eastern Europe is entering a phase of systemic crisis, and so is the Soviet Union itself. The fate of *perestroika* is most uncertain. My own judgement is that its prospects are less favourable than the prospects for successful economic change in China. The Chinese programme of reform is more ambitious, better designed and grounded in more favourable social, economic and cultural circumstances than the Soviet programme. There is in China a societal capac-

ity to use the reforms for economic advantage. These conditions are lacking in the Soviet Union.

This is why, in a recent major report to the President of the United States, a group of strategists of which I was a part concluded that by the year 2010 it is likely that the global economic hierarchy will be as follows: the United States will still be in first place, China will be second, Japan will be close behind in third pace, and the Soviet Union will be fourth.

These prognoses obviously foretell a dramatic change in the position of the Soviet Union, not only in relationship to Eastern Europe but also in relation to the world at large. The solution to that dilemma will not be easily found, and *perestroika* might well not be the solution. The ultimate weakness of the Soviet Union and, therefore, the *perestroika* programme, is rooted in the fact that the Soviet Union is itself a multi-national empire. Decentralisation of a multi-national empire often leads to the dissolution of the empire itself.

We are at the beginning of a protracted period of internal uncertainty in the Soviet Union. For the foreseeable future, so far as the West in general and the United States in particular are concerned, there is going to be a one-dimensional rival: a rival in the military domain, whose might is not to be underestimated, for its capacity to project and develop military power remains enormous. Beyond that, it has already lost the ideological and economic competition which provide the underpinning for competition for world domination.

This may increase the Soviet temptation to play the German card, but it also, I suspect, reduces the scope of that card. Given the weakness of the Communist régimes in Eastern Europe, and given the economic and political weakness of the Soviet Union itself, the emergence of a quasi-neutral Germany could create conditions for the more rapid dismantling of the Soviet empire, stimulating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary the desire for an equally neutral status. Without direct control of eastern Germany, control over this fermenting region would be all the more difficult.

For the West, this creates a historic setting for enlightened policies on the East-West issue. Massive revolutionary outbreak in the region is not in our interest. Were that to occur, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to intervene. It is almost equally certain that the West would impotently stand by, and that reform in the region and *perestroika* in the Soviet Union would be the victims. Thus, an explosion is not something we should be fermenting or waiting for or welcoming. Gradual change, on the other hand, is desirable. It should be facilitated, and it is feasible.

Its strategic and historical goal should not be the absorption of what was once called Eastern Europe into what is still called Western Europe, but the progressive emergence of a truly independent, culturally authentic Central Europe. It would perhaps be *de facto* neutral — neutral in substance if not in form, in the context of the geo-political reality of contemporary Europe. If this is to take place, it has to be deliberately promoted, by the encouragement of political change, by the sustaining of political resistance, by the promotion of an ever-larger political dialogue within the East and by the development of more expansive East-West economic contacts.

Beyond that, it is not impossible to use conventional arms control for intelligence, military and also political purposes. I think it is quite likely that the Soviet Union will try to exploit the INF agreement to promote extensive East-West negotiations, pointing towards the liquidation of all battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe. This would have the effect of denuclearising Western Europe, a long-standing Soviet objective.

Eastern Europe is entering a phase of crisis, and so is the USSR

Why not meet this on equally appealing political grounds with proposals in the area of conventional arms, aiming at the reduction and eventually removal from central Europe of main battlefield tanks? It is a military fact that a thin-out of tanks, not to speak of their ultimate removal from certain regions of Europe, would greatly reduce the capacity of the Soviet Union for offensive military operations. The notion of a "tank-free zone" in Europe could be an appealing response to the deceptive and destabilising Soviet promotion of nuclear-free zones in Europe.

Last but not least, it is time for our governments to consult quietly in order to develop contingency plans for possible crises in Eastern Europe, to use that old geographical term. If there are to be major eruptions, let us not be cause by surprise. Let us be ready with proposals designed to diminish the Soviet temptation to repeat the performance of 1848, 1956 or 1968.

This article is based on the Seton-Watson Memorial lecture, given to the Centre for Policy Studies. Dr Brzezinski was National Security Adviser to President Carter.

SUBJECT: Talking Points for DCI - 29 April 88 Luncheon with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

You will be lunching with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski on Friday, 29 April. The DDCI and the DDO will attend. Dr. Brzezinski has offered to share his observations on the changing situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and to discuss the opportunities this presents for U.S. foreign policy.

POINTS TO BE MADE BY DCI:

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o--You may also wish to express appreciation for the opportunity our officers have to meet with him from time to time to share observations on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We value his counsel highly, particularly during this period of historic change in the Soviet sphere.

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o--Dr. Brzezinski will probably offer a tour d'horizon of current developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The essence of his observations is contained in the attached article, which is based on a lecture he delivered in London earlier this year. The key points are:

> Communism was imposed on Eastern Europe from outside, i.e. by the Soviet Union, a country considered by East Europeans to be inferior, economically and culturally. It remains an alien ideology, one which virtually everyone in Eastern Europe now believes is a bankrupt and discredited model.

In the past, dissident activities in Eastern Europe occurred in isolation. Today, however, they are a regional phenomenon, playing out against a backdrop of systemic crisis and stagnation. The result is a dynamic pulling toward a regional identity independent of the Soviet Union.

The real opportunity for the U.S., and the West, is to encourage development of this Eastern, or Central European identity. Without stating it by name, Brzezinski is speaking of the "Finlandization" of Eastern Europe.

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

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Both of these very important handicaps to Soviet imperial sway were obscured by the understandable desire of the population of the region for rapid social and economic recovery. They were obscured by the mirage of catching up with the West, which was one of the major claims of the new Communist régimes: that relatively quickly Poland or Czechoslovakia would outstrip, say, Great Britain in industrial development and general modernisation. They were obscured by reverence to Soviet power, very real in the wake of the defeat of Nazi Germany, and even by a perverse admiration for Stalin's personal power.

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During the 1950s and even the 1960s, the Soviet Union and its Communist parties in Western Europe represented a genuine threat to freedom west of the Elba. The Soviet Union enjoyed a kind of historical prestige, as well as some sense that it was riding the way of the future. We did not forget how optimistic Khrushchev had been in 1960, when he not only categorically predicted, but had it explicitly inscribed in the official Communist Party programme, that by 1970 the Soviet Union would be the number one industrial power in the world. This prediction has been excised from the newly revised Communist Party programme.

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Eastern Europe is entering a phase of systemic crisis, and so is the Soviet Union itself. The fate of *perestroika* is most uncertain. My own judgement is that its prospects are less favourable than the prospects for successful economic change in China. The Chinese programme of reform is more ambitious, better designed and grounded in more favourable social, economic and cultural circumstances than the Soviet programme. There is in China a societal capac-

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This may increase the Soviet temptation to play the German card, but it also, I suspect, reduces the scope of that card. Given the weakness of the Communist régimes in Eastern Europe, and given the economic and political weakness of the Soviet Union itself, the emergence of a quasi-neutral Germany could create conditions for the more rapid dismantling of the Soviet empire, stimulating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary the desire for an equally neutral status. Without direct control of eastern Germany, control over this fermenting region would be all the more difficult.

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